Per analysin comparativam Tabulae 3, inventum est valor capacitatis obtentus ex teste positivo connexionis inter bushings fuit relativus proximus ad valorem actualem. Tamen, affectus per capacitatem stragalem intra interruptorem circuituum, adhuc fuit quaedam deviatio inter valorem mensuratam et calculatum. Tamen, ex resultatis testium capacitatum parallelarum portus interrumpentis inter phases ABC, differentiae capacitatis inter tres phases erant relativae parvae. Ex hoc, initio iudicatum est status condensatoris parallelus portus interrumpentis phase C esse normalis.
(5) Inspectio Interna Vasculi Interruptoris Circuituum
In loco curae defectus, gas phase C interruptoris circuituum defectivi fuit professionaliter recuperatus. Deinde, endoscopium usum est ad inspectionem profundam internam vasculi. Post inspectionem detegentem, inventum est resistens claudens prope latus bus Ⅱ habuit rupturn. Fragmenta nigrorum chip resistance dispersa erant in fundo vasculi. Praeterea, inventum est etiam sheath polytetrafluoroethylene unius resistens claudens fuit fissus et cecidit in fundum vasculi.
2.1.1 Inspectio Disconnectoris
Post inspectionem detegentem in loco, signa incendi manifesta inventa sunt in partibus digitis arcanis contactuum mobilium utriusque lateris phase C disconnectorum utriusque lateris interruptoris circuituum defectivi. Deinde, per operationem manualem disconnectoris phase C in loco, totus processus operationis fuit lenis sine ulla obstruxione. Praeterea, durante inspectione, observatum est non fuisse phenomenum coesionis inter contactus mobiles et staticos. Post completionem operationis aperturae, inspectio detegens contactuum basis staticorum et digitorum contactuum facta est, et nulla signa incendi gravis inventa sunt.
2.1.2 Inspectio Instrumentorum Secundariorum
Ad 12:31:50.758 die 18 Iunii 2022, phase C interruptoris circuituum defectivi in 750kV substatione fuit ad terram. Post defectum, protectio differentialis fibra-optica lineae et protectio differentialis bus 750kV Bus-Ⅱ ambae recte operatae sunt. Per analysin profunda currentis defectus et operationis protectionis differentialis bus et protectionis lineae, quando disconnector erat in statu clauso (durante quo tensio systematis remansit stabilis sine over-voltage), observatum est 750kV Bus-Ⅱ suppeditavit currentem defectus ad punctum defectus. Notabile est CT₇ et CT₈ involved in the bus differential protection of the faulty circuit breaker did not detect the existence of fault current. Based on this observation, it was determined that the fault point should be in the area between circuit breaker CT₇ and the bus. Meanwhile, CT₁ and CT₂ for line protection detected the existence of fault current, and the value of the fault current reached a primary current of 4.5kA. Therefore, it was further inferred that the fault point was in the area between CT₂ of the faulty circuit breaker and the interrupting port on the Ⅱ-bus side of the circuit breaker. This inference was consistent with the location of the fault point found in the on-site internal inspection.
2.2 Dismantling Inspection
As shown in Figure 2, during the inspection of the inside of the tank during the circuit breaker dismantling process, fragments of the closing resistance and its protective sheath were observed scattered around. Some resistance chips of the fourth-column closing resistance, which was connected in parallel with the main interrupting port on the mechanism side of the circuit breaker, had exploded, and the corresponding two resistance protective sheaths had also ruptured. End shield A of the resistance showed traces of discharge ablation on the inner wall of the tank, and shield B also had traces of discharge ablation on A. In addition, the surface of the insulating support rod showed blackened traces. By checking the assembly, factory test, and on-site installation data of the circuit breaker, and inspecting the main insulating parts, no abnormalities were found.

3 Fault Cause Analysis
Through dismantling analysis, the following conclusions were drawn: During the closing process of the disconnect switch, the end shield A of the resistance first discharged to the inner wall of the tank. This led to abnormal currents in the fourth, third, and second-column closing resistances. Subsequently, shield B discharged to A, causing the second and third-column resistances to short-circuit, and the current was mainly concentrated in the fourth column. This phenomenon caused the temperature of the resistance chips in the fourth column to rise sharply, eventually leading to explosion, and the resistance protective sheath broke and fell off. During the discharge process, the generation of high-temperature arcs caused the surface of the insulating support rod to become blackened.
The tank-type circuit breaker can withstand a lightning impulse voltage of up to 2100kV. During the normal closing process of the disconnect switch, although over-voltage may occur, under normal operating conditions, this level of over-voltage is not sufficient to trigger the discharge mechanism of the circuit breaker. However, through in-depth analysis and inference, it is preliminarily suspected that there may be foreign objects inside the tank. These foreign objects may have an adverse impact on the electric field distribution, causing the electric field to distort and exceeding the insulation strength that the SF₆ gas gap can withstand. In this case, end shield A of the resistance may first discharge to the inner wall of the tank. Considering that the foreign objects inside the tank may be hidden in imperceptible crevices, when the disconnect switch is closed with power on, the over-voltage generated may, under the action of the electric field force, move the foreign objects to areas with a stronger electric field, thereby causing electric field distortion and leading to the occurrence of discharge phenomena.
4 Conclusion
Given the extensive application of advanced switchgear in the power system, accidents such as tripping of tank-type circuit breakers and GIS equipment due to foreign objects occur frequently. To prevent such faults, it is necessary to strengthen live-line detection work, especially increasing the detection frequency for circuit breakers that operate frequently. At the same time, during on-site acceptance, it should be strictly checked whether the equipment has completed 200 mechanical operations to ensure the running-in of the mechanism and avoid the adverse effects of metal debris on the operation of the equipment after commissioning.